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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
With an overindebted public-sector, Brazil has been on the brink of a fiscal dominance 
problem for quite a long time. The term has been usually associated to a situation in 
which monetary policy becomes subordinated to fiscal needs. This paper calls attention 
to broader implications of prolonged exposure to impending fiscal dominance. A high-
debt environment may make perfectly reasonable fiscal-reform initiatives seem 
extremely risky. Without any room to absorb revenue losses, in a complex fiscal-
federalism arrangement, the government is bound to recurrently see badly needed tax 
reform, which could lead to a much less distorting tax system, as an unaffordable 
adventure. 
 
The paper is structured in the following way. The next section presents stylized facts 
that have been underlying a whole decade of unsuccessful tax-reform attempts in 
Brazil. Section 3 shows how the combination of those facts creates very unfavorable 
conditions for the approval of the kind of tax reform the country needs. A simple 
political economy model is developed in section 4. Simulations based on the model are 
analyzed in sections 5 and 6. Concluding remarks are presented in the last section. 
 
2.  STYLIZED FACTS 
 
There is a widespread feeling in Brazil that, once again, a good opportunity to carry on 
a thorough and much needed tax reform has been lost. This time, by the Lula 
government. After a decade of supposedly reformist resolution in that area, very little 
was in fact achieved. In hindsight, there seems to be important common facts that cut 
across the various unsuccessful tax-reform attempts observed over the period. The 
conjunction of those facts appears to be hampering the required collective action that 
could turn the reform feasible and to be giving way to what at first sight seems to be 
simply a deplorable conformism. From a careful analysis of how little was really 
accomplished by the convoluted tax-reform efforts observed in the country since the 
mid-nineties, five crucial facts seem to stand out. 
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Abstract objective 
Since 1997, at least, the debate on tax reform in the country has been dominated by the 
concern with the irrationality of the tax system. The consensual view has been that the 
required reform should be able to make the tax system less complex, less inefficient 
and less obstructive of economic growth, without altering either the tax burden or the 
shares of three government levels in the aggregate tax revenue. There may be good 
reasons to try to conduct an efficiency-enhancing tax reform in Brazil along these 
lines, but one has to recognize that such reform has an extremely abstract objective. It 
is not something that can galvanize the electorate. In fact, there are good reasons to 
believe that that objective has not even been well understood by a large part of the 
country’s political elite. 
 
Remote benefits 
Even among those that are perfectly able to grasp the importance of rationalizing the 
tax system, the dominant view is that benefits of a reform focused on such objective, 
substantial as they may be, will only be strongly felt after a number of years. 
Especially, of course, if the reform contemplates a slow phasing in of the involved 
changes. 
 
Virtues of old taxes 
Part of the most influential opinions about tax reform come from the elite of the tax 
collecting bureaucracy (at the three government levels), tax lawyers and members of 
the Judiciary, who are all prone to defend the idea that the good tax is the old tax. 
Collecting an old tax would always be far less problematic than trying to collect a new 
one. In its unabated defense of the status quo, that segment of the public opinion is 
invariably ready to try to sink any reform proposal with a barrage of worrying presages 
of endless judicial litigations. 
 
The reform is only feasible in the first year of the presidential term 
Tax reform is seen as a complex challenge that can only be successfully faced in the 
first of the four years of the presidential term. In the second year, there are municipal   5
elections. In the last, it is unthinkable. In the third, amid the political mobilization for 
the general elections of the fouth year, it is definitely too late. 
 
Revenue-loss risk 
Last but not least, there has been much uneasiness about the possible fiscal costs of a 
reform. With all government levels facing a hard-budget constraint, there is a great 
fear of revenue loss. A fear that affects not only mayors and governors but the central 
government itself. Only sizable changes in the tax system would be able to assure 
substantial efficiency gains. But bolder changes entail higher risk of considerable 
revenue loss. Of course, the reform could include an agreement on compensation rules 
within the federation. Yet the fear persists. Who can assure those rules will not be 
changed in the future? 
 
3.  TAX REFORM AND UNCERTAINTY 
 
Those facts seem to establish very unfavorable conditions for the approval of the kind 
of tax reform the country needs. An important reform that can really make a difference 
in terms of efficiency gains requires some degree of boldness. But the bolder the 
reform, the higher the risk of revenue losses. Apprehensions with possible losses tend 
to be exacerbated by prophecies of overwhelming waves of judicial injunctions 
brandished by defenders of the virtues of old taxes. Having in mind their hard-budget 
constraints, governors and mayors tend to oppose bolder changes, unless they can be 
assured of full compensation of any losses by the Union. The federal government, 
having to face its own risk of revenue loss, has to decide whether such compensation 
can be really assured. It may also fear that if the Pandora box of a bold tax reform is 
opened, subnational governments may size the opportunity to extract from Congress a 
more generous piece of the aggregate tax revenue pie. For one reason or the other, the 
federal government has to decide whether it can stand the costs of having to keep a 
more precarious fiscal stance. Given the public-sector`s overindebtedness, the 
generation of sizable primary surpluses on a steady basis has become a crucial 
condition to bring down real interest rates and put the economy on a sustainable 
expansion path. With the government strongly pressed to deliver economic growth, the   6
idea of abandoning a sound fiscal position to bet on a risky tax reform may not sound 
very attractive. Economic benefits seem remote and there is no possibility of getting 
strong popular support out of a reform with such abstract objectives. Particularly when 
the next election seems so near. 
 
Figure 3.1 presents a diagram that helps to visualize how the tax reform may be an 
important source of uncertainty about the public-sector primary balance. Assume that 
the degree of boldness of the tax reform is measured by R. The bolder the efficiency-
enhancing tax reform (the greater R), the more drastic will be the required changes in 
the tax system applied to the aggregate output Y. The more drastic the changes, the 
higher the uncertainty over the aggregate tax revenue (Rev) and over how it will be 
split among the three government levels (federal, state and municipal) and, therefore, 











To take account of such effects and to better understand how they may influence 
government’s decisions about the tax reform, a simple political economy model is 
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4.  A POLITICAL ECONOMY MODEL 
 
In a discrete-time economy, consider the timing of events shown in Figure 4.1. The 
presidential term starts in t = 0. Sometime later, in a predetermined time t = τ, the 
government concludes the political negotiation of the tax reform, and takes a decision 
on how bold the reform will be. In the model, that decision amounts to choosing a 
value for R, that measures the degree of boldness of the tax reform. The immediate 
implementation of such reform triggers the realization of z, the public-sector primary 









The standard linearized debt-dynamics equation for this economy may be written as  
 
bt = (1 + it – yt) bt-1  –  z         [1] 
 














begins   8
where  bt is the public-sector debt and z the primary balance, both measured as a 
proportion of the aggregate product. The real interest rate is given by it and the 
economy’s growth rate by yt .   
 
A heavier public-sector indebtedness leads to a higher real interest rate, as assumed in 
the constant-elasticity function 
 
it = α (bt-1)
η          [2] 
 
Presuming there is substantial excess capacity, the economy’s growth rate yt  is 
expressed as 
 
yt = ν + λR – κit-1 – γz        [3] 
 
where it is shown to be negatively affected by both the real interest rate and the 
primary balance, and positively affected by R, that measures the degree of boldness of 
the tax reform. Without any loss of generality, it is assumed that R is restricted to the 
interval [0 , 1] and that R = 0 means no reform.  
 
The primary balance is supposed to be drawn from a known distribution f , with mean 
µz and standard deviation σz  
 
z ~ f(z | µz , σz)           [4] 
 
In order to take into account the premise that a bolder tax-reform brings greater 
uncertainty over the primary balance, the standard deviation σz is assumed for 
simplicity to be  
 
σz = φR         [5] 
   9
Decision on R involves the maximization of the government’s objective function, 
written as 
 
W(R) = E{τΣT βtU[Yt(R)]}           [6] 
 
where βt is a discount factor and  
 
Yt = (1 – yt) Yt-1         [7] 
 
is the level of aggregate product. What is assumed is that government is basically 
concerned with the growth performance of the economy. It chooses the value of R that 
maximizes the expected present discounted utility of aggregate output, over the 
remaining part of the presidential term, after period τ, when the decision on R is finally 
taken.  
 
5.  SIMULATIONS 
  
In order to run simulations and to develop a feeling for the possible magnitude of the 
involved effects, R was initially set to zero and plausible values were assigned to 
parameters and predetermined variables, having in mind the situation of the Brazilian 
economy in the end of 2003. Presuming that z, the public-sector primary balance, 
would remain unchanged at 0.0425, the model was calibrated in such a way as to make 
the system formed by the first three equations simulate acceptable paths for bt , it and yt 
. More precisely, to simulate paths for the three variables that would be considered, in 
late 2003, a reasonably probable macroeconomic scenario for the remaining 12 
quarters of presidential term the Lula government still had at that point: a virtuous 
circle of slowly decreasing public-sector indebtedness, falling interest rates and 
moderate growth resumption. 
 
As mentioned above, the range of variation of R was constrained to [0 , 1], the boldest 
kind of reform corresponding to R = 1 and no reform to R = 0. The parameter λ in   10
equation [3] was calibrated accordingly. The distribution f, from which z is drawn, was 
assumed to be a truncated normal distribution with mean 0.0425, minimum value 0.02 
and maximum value 0.045. As for the standard deviation, the assumption that φ = 0.01 
in equation [5]  made σz = 0.01 R. Given the range of R, that means that σz was allowed 
to assume values between zero and 0.01.  
 
For each value attributed to R, Monte Carlo simulations, based on a distribution with 
the corresponding σz(R) determined by equation [5], were run. Figure 5.1 presents 
distributions of the public-sector primary balance z, obtained from four different values 
attributed to R. The less dispersed one corresponds to R =0.1 and the most dispersed to 
R = 1.0. The other two were generated making R equal to 0.3 and 0.5.    
 
Figure 5.1 
Distribution of z for Different Values of R 






For each value of z drawn from a distribution obtained from a given R, the system 
formed by the first three equations was solved, and the resulting yt plugged in equation 
[7] in order to get the values of Yt to be inserted in the objective function [6]. When 
this process reached the last draw of z, the value of W(R) in [6] was computed. As that 
routine was repeated for different values of R, spaced over its whole range, W(R) could 
be plotted and the optimal value of R determined. 
   11
 
Figure 5.2 shows a clear picture of how expected macroeconomic performance over 
the considered period could be affected by the choice of R. It presents four 
distributions of the level of aggregate output Yt in the last quarter of the presidential 
term, generated by the model from the same four distributions of z shown in Figure 
5.1. (It was assumed that Y0 = 100). The higher the value of R the greater the 
uncertainty about the expected level of  Yt in the end period. 
 
Figure 5.2 
Distribution of the Level of the Aggregate Output in the End Period 





Assuming risk-aversion, a simple constant-elasticity specification for U(Y) was used in 
the government’s objective function given by equation [6]. The plot of the resulting 
objective function W(R), generated by the model as different values were attributed to 
R, is presented in Figure 5.3.  
 
The optimal R value is relatively small, implying that the chosen reform would be 








The Government’s Objective Function 
      




An alternative specification for the objective function [6] was also used. Instead of 
assuming that the government would maximize the expected present discounted utility 
of aggregate output over the remaining part of the presidential term, it was simply 
assumed that the government would maximize the expected utility of the total growth 
of the economy over that same period. That amounts to write the modified objective 
function as 
 
WM(R) = E{U[YT(R) – Yτ ]}           [7] 
 
The plot of the modified objective function, generated by the model as different values 
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Figure 5.4 
The Government’s Modified Objective Function 





6.  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS  
 
It is interesting to explore the sensitivity of the simulation results to values attributed to 
the two parameters directly related to the variable R in the model. They are the main 
determinants of the trade-off involved in the government’s decision. The first of them 
is φ, which determines how R affects the standard deviation of the primary balance z in 
equation [5]. It measures to which extent a bolder reform would make the primary 
balance more uncertain. In the simulations discussed above it was assumed that φ = 
0.01. Given that R was constrained to [0 , 1],  that assumption ultimately meant letting 
σz assume values between zero and 0.01. Figure 6.1 shows the sensitivity of the 
optimal value of R to φ, for each of the two objective functions considered. When 
W(R) is used as objective function, if φ is reduced to 0.0075, the optimal value of R 
increases 0.4. Lowering φ to 0.0066 is enough to make the optimal value of R jump to 
1.0, the boldest degree of tax reform. However, when WM(R)  is used as objective 
function, φ would have to be brought down to as low as 0.003 to make the optimal R 
value reach 1.0. But, as may be seen in the chart on the right-hand side of Figure 6.1, 
the optimal value of R increases steadily as φ is reduced from 0.1 to 0.03.   14
 
Figure 6.1 
Sensitivity of the optimal value of R to φ 
 
 
When W(R) is used as objective function       When WM(R) is used as objective function 
 
            
























Sensitivity of the optimal value of R to λ 
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The other parameter to be considered is λ, which determines the intensity of the 
positive effect of R on the economy’s quarterly growth rate yt in equation [3]. In the 
simulations discussed above, λ was assumed to be equal to 0.0005, implying that the 
boldest tax reform (R = 1) would add approximately 0.2 percentage point to the annual 
growth rate of each of the last three years of the presidential term. Of course, the 
stronger the assumed effect of R on yt  the bolder the tax reform will tend to be. Figure 
6.2 shows  how the optimal value of R increases as the value attributed to λ is raised, 
for each of the two objective functions considered. When W(R) is used as objective 
function, the optimal value of R increases to 0.3 if λ is raised to 0.006, and jumps to 
1.0 if λ is raised still further to 0.007. But when WM(R) is used as objective function, 
the optimal value shows to be well less sensitive to λ, as may be seen in the right-hand 
chart of Figure 6.2. The value attributed to λ would have to be raised to 0.0013 to make 
the optimal value reach 1.0. Such a high value of λ would mean to presume that the 
boldest tax reform could add more than half percentage point to the annual growth rate 
of each of the last three years of the presidential term.    
 
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
It goes without saying that the model has a clear message. A tax reform will have a 
better chance of being carried out the stronger its immediate direct impact on 
economic growth and the more limited the uncertainty it casts on the public-sector’s 
primary balance.  
 
The analysis developed above is no more than a first attempt to model an intriguingly 
complex political economy problem. There are many extensions to be explored. The 
idea that the uncertainty entailed by the tax reform may lead to a worryingly smaller 
primary surplus could be modeled in a more elaborated way. Instead of simply 
assuming, that, after the realization of z, the primary surplus remains unchanged for the 
rest of the presidential term, as established in section 4, the model could allow for a 
gradual recovery of the surplus in the same presidential term. Of course the recovery   16
would involve time and political costs and economic growth would be harmed while 
the primary surplus remained below the mark. 
 
Allowing for the possibility of re-election would also turn the model more realistic. In 
principle, a longer time horizon to reap the benefits of the tax reform could make the 
government fight for a bolder reform. But, of course, to be able to be re-elected the 
government would still have to consider the uncertain effects of the tax reform on 
economic growth over the first presidential term. An interesting possibility to be 
explored would involve decision on a reform to be approved in a given presidential 
term and phased in only in the following one.  
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